pakistan army

Many believe the Army should be defenders of the country.  The question we are attempting to answer however is: Has the Pakistani Army defended the nation?  The answer is anyone’s guess, but we have tried to show both sides of the picture. 

The Army came into being with the existence of Pakistan in 1947.  At the time it was created, Pakistan was supposed to be given 36% of the armed forces of India (Previous India).  In reality, they were given a third of what was decided upon.  With that, they are today the seventh largest army in the world.    It was not until 1958 that the power of the Army was given to a General (General Ayub Khan).  It was his predecessor who first enforced Martial Law (General Yahya Khan).

The second Military coup took place during the reign of President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq.  Many people blame the current state of the nation on the actions of Zia-ul-Haq (Extremism).  The Third Military coup took place in 1999, with General Musharraf. [1] Since his rule, the nation has largely been dominated by the Army.  Army officials now hold senior positions in schools, factories, hospitals, public services, etc. 

It is interesting to note, that being a democratic nation, the Army is the most powerful institution in Pakistan. It has been actively repelling concerns, both externally and internally.  The internal issues have to a large effect been blamed on Zia-Ul-Haq (Extremism, Lal Masque)[2]

There have largely been 2 problems with the Army.  They are the following:

1.      Control all aspects of society by Army (Politics, Economics, Social, Judiciary, and Government.)

2.      70% of the National Income is spent on defense, whereas the army doesn’t produce any GDP cash inflow.

The Army controls much of Pakistan, such as policies being passed, the economy, the social life of the people, the judiciary, and the government.  If at any point, there is a point of concern in society which may in any way hurt the army, the army performs a coup, and finishes off the threat.  They have a large influence on the economy, owning more than 96 businesses.[3]    By controlling the economy, they control the amount of money people can spend.  They also control the judiciary; take the example of the Supreme Court being dismembered during the time of President Musharraf[4], he had told the people that it was for security reasons rather speaking the truth. Second point to look into, is that 70% of the National Income goes into Defense.  They do not however bring in any Cash Inflows when it comes to GDP.

Whenever the army see’s there is political instability in the nation, it comes in and overthrows the standing government.

Let’s look into the positives and negatives of the Pakistani Army:

Positive side

The primary role of the military is to defend the country against all internal and external threats. It is trained, organized and equipped accordingly. However, its strength in manpower, discipline and flexible organization, makes it a suitable force for employment in developmental projects. Many armies in the recent times have tried to share the economic burden of their country by undertaking nation-building projects. Noteworthy among them are the Peoples Liberation Army of China (PLA) and the Malaysian, Iranian and Royal Thai Armies. Several Pakistan army organizations performed functions that were important to the civilian sector and contributed Rupees 179 billion in last five year in term of revenue/taxes. Pak Army helps the nation almost everywhere .Some of its major services for nation building are as under:

In times of natural disaster, such as the great floods of 1992, army engineers, medical and logistics personnel, and the armed forces played a major role in bringing relief and supplies. The army also engaged in extensive economic activities. Most of these enterprises, such as stud and dairy farms, were for the army's own use, but others performed functions beneficial to the local civilian economy. Army factories produced such goods as sugar, fertilizer, and brass castings and sold them to civilian consumers.

National Logistic Cell: Several army organizations performed functions that were important to the civilian sector across the country. For example, the National Logistics Cell was responsible for trucking food and other goods across the country; the Frontier Works Organization built the Karakoram Highway to China; and the Special Communication Organization maintained communications networks in remote parts of Pakistan.[5]

Anti Narcotics Force (ANF): ANF combated narcotics in a manner that today Pakistan is almost getting free of this ugly disease. The Pakistan army stands today as the most organized, potent and influential institution in the country. It has a cohesive and task-oriented profile with a strong esprit de corps. Military leaders, both retired and serving, take an active role in the country's administration and economy.
Rescue and Relief. Earthquake Pakistan Army was spread out at 80 key points in the quake zone, its engineers opened vital routes including the one from Abbotabad to Muzaffarabad through lightening overnight efforts, medical teams and relief supplies reached out to people in the remotest areas to provide food and medical treatment. 50,000 troops of Pakistan Army were moved quickly[6] in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe and they restored communication infrastructure in the difficult mountainous region through round-the-clock work, therefore providing (867627) tents, (5569803) blankets, (7348) tons of ration, (1803) tons of medicine and (30941) tons of miscellaneous items.[7]

Army Engineers: FWO restore all roads in flood-hit Balochistan, Sindh. Troops of Pakistan Army Engineers and Frontier ‘Works Organization (FWO) after relentless efforts have restored all road links in flood hit areas of Balochistan and Sindh which were badly destroyed due to pre-monsoon rains in June. Repair of Jumani Bridge in a very short span of time by Army Engineers was another herculean task which helped the restoration of traffic flow on the main highway between Quetta and Karachi.
The army points to the lack of capacity to respond effectively, claiming that it is the only viable institution in the country that can cope with disasters on a large scale. It asserts that there are no comparable civilian institutions which could complement or supplant it. While this is true, it ignores the behavioral context where the army itself has eroded civilian institutions. Ergo, it cannot invoke institutional and administrative lacunae when it created them in the first place. The absence of alternative coping mechanisms has given the army carte blanche and has raised concerns about governance and institutional sustainability. As affectees and as recipients of assistance, the communities are best placed to comment on issues of transparency and accountability. What follows is a distillation of views obtained from focus group discussions with communities and key respondent interviews.[8]

Negative side

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa’s book Military Inc – Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy provides an insight into the vast and expansive empire that the Pakistani Military has set up in Pakistan over the past six decades. Not surprisingly, the book, published in June 2007 is banned in Pakistan.

The book estimates the military’s share of the economy at over 20 billion dollars, besides owning 11.58 million acres.

What has happened in Pakistan is that any sector which could be monopolized, has been attempted by the military. The military is entrenched in the corporate sector. The list of industries where military or ex-military were in charge included steel mills, sugar factories, cement factories, fertilizer factories, cereal factories, banks, logistics companies, construction companies, utilities, even universities and other higher education institutions.

Milbus or military business

Dr. Siddiqa uses the term Milbus or military business to describe the vast economic empire of the army. Milbus is found in other countries as well. However, Pakistan’s Milbus signifies internal political and economic predation of the military, she says.

Today the Pakistan military's internal economy is extensive, and has turned the armed forces into one of the dominant economic players. The most noticeable and popular component of Milbus relates to the business ventures of the four welfare foundations: the Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Bahria Foundation (BF). These foundations are subsidiaries of the defense establishment.

Retired and serving officers run secretive industrial conglomerates, manufacture everything from cement to cornflakes, and own 12m acres (4.8m hectares) of public land, says Dr Ayesha Siddiqa. Of the 96 businesses run by the four largest foundations, only nine file public accounts. The generals spurn demands by parliament to account for public monies they spend.

Since the four foundations were established under the Charitable Endowment Act 1890 or the Societies Registration Act 1860 as private entities, the accounts of these foundations are not audited by the government's prime accounting agency the Auditor- General of Pakistan.

Siddiqa’s research indicates that the military businesses thrive, thanks to invisible state subsidies in the form of free land, the use of military assets, and loans to bail them out when they run into trouble. Given the lack of transparency of the military-controlled companies, it was not possible to access updated financial information. From a technical/legal standpoint, the welfare foundations are not liable to provide information regarding their operations to the public.

The Army Welfare Trust (AWT)

According to the book: "The Army Welfare Trust (AWT) asked for a financial bailout worth five billion rupees in 1997 and was given relief worth two billion from the national exchequer by the Sharif government. A bail out was again requested from the Sharif regime in February 1999. The finance ministry referred the matter to the parliament’s cabinet committee of economic affairs with the request that it approve a guarantee of Rs2.5 billion which would be used to redeem the earlier guarantee of four billion rupees. The AWT had sought a fresh loan to pay off part of the earlier financial liability. A fresh financial guarantee was sought from the government despite the fact that the army welfare trust was declared to be a private sector entity which could not get financial aid from the government as the latter was not responsible for its debt repayment. The AWT also borrowed from local national and private banks and the international financial market. Approximately six and a half billion rupees out of a total of fifteen billion rupees deficit was borrowed from the National Bank of Pakistan, Allied Bank Limited and ABN-Amro against official guarantees. In addition, AWT owed one and a half billion rupees to a foreign financial company Laith Ltd which had filed a recovery suit against it in the United Kingdom."

The Fauji Foundation

The Fauji Foundation does not fare dramatically different. One learns from reading the book that the Fauji-Jordan Fertilizer Company secured four foreign currency loans. This comprised US$30 million from the Canadian Export Development Corp, US$ 53 million from Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufabau of Germany, US$ 57 million from a consortium of French banks and a US$ 40 million facility from the Export-Import Bank of the United States. The money was used to purchase a second hand ammonia plant from the United States worth US$ 370 million. This did not turn out to be a wise investment as in 2001 FJFC's stock fell by 21.1 per cent within thirteen weeks. This compelled President Musharraf to ask Fauji Foundation to improve the profitability of certain projects. This advice was given along with financial help from the government. The government's economic survey shows that Fauji Foundation was consistently subsidized to the tune of over one billion rupees annually. No such help has been extended to other private sector organizations.

Frontier Works Organization

The book also talks about the Frontier Works Organization. According to Audit Report 179 for the financial year 1999/2000 there was a deficit of Rs4,076.868 million. The organization's receipts for the financial year were Rs4,191.365 million and the expenditure was Rs5,171.391 million. The difference of Rs980.026 million represents deficit expenditure that was borne by the state.

The book cites Special Audit Report 187 on the accounts of the cantonment boards of Clifton in Karachi, Walton in Lahore, Sialkot and Gujranwala pointed out a loss of Rs1,006.083 million as a result of illegal conversion of military residential land for commercial use and another Rs129.700 million because of the commercialization of land originally meant for the army's operational use. It is important to mention that the military land manual forbids the use of military land for any purpose other than the defense force's operations, the book says.

Army Generals are neo-land barons

But the biggest and the most visible perk is the rural and urban land given out to serving and retired officers. They also get subsidies and other benefits to develop the land. A major-general can expect to receive on retirement a present of 240 acres of prime farmland, worth on average 1.1 million dollars as well an urban real estate plot valued at 1.4 million dollars. The Pakistan military, as a single group, owns more land than any other institution or group, amounting to about 12 per cent of total state land. And unlike other state institutions, the military can convert this land for private usage.

The military is a significant stakeholder in agricultural land. Out of the 11.58 million acres that is controlled by the armed forces, an estimated 6.9 million acres, or about 59 per cent of the total land, is in rural areas.  Out of the 11.58 million acres that is controlled by the armed forces, an estimated 6.9 million acres, or about 59 per cent of the total land, is in rural areas.

Of the 11.58 million acres of land under its control, more than half is owned by individual members of the armed forces, mainly officers. Ms. Siddiqa argues that the “monopolization” of land by the armed forces is aimed not just at increasing the financial worth of individuals or groups within the army, but also to increase its social and political worth. “The military owes it authority to change the usage of land to its phenomenal political clout. The land redistribution policy has an impact on the relationship between the powerful ruling elite in the country — of which the military is a part — and the masses.”

The military has also begun to act in the manner of a feudal landlord. When landless peasants in central Punjab complained in 2001 that the army had changed the status of the land on which they depended for their subsistence (forcing them to pay rent in cash, rather than working the land on a sharecropping basis) the army cracked down, beating many and leaving eight dead. At one point, Dr Siddiqa quotes a naval officer who questions why landless peasants should have any rights in relation to the land they till. ‘They do not deserve land just because they are poor,’ he says.

The subsidiary foundations, the FF, AWT and BF, are all beneficiaries of the defense establishment's land grant policy. The FF farm in Nukerji in Sindh covers 2,498 acres.23 Located close to the foundation-owned sugar mills, the  farm is used to experiment in trying to develop new varieties of sugar cane. The AWT's main ownership of agricultural land is in the form of its partnership with the army in controlling the Okara farms. The BF's farms are used mainly as dairy farms to provide milk and other dairy products at subsidized rates to serving naval officers.

The military has acquired about 6.9 million acres of land for further redistribution to individual officers and soldiers. The entire concept of land grants to the military is mired in the larger and redundant colonial tradition of buying allegiance in exchange for land. As part of the policy pursued after 1857, the British rewarded their loyal subjects with land and access to water sources for irrigation. [9]

Army in high civilian positions

Not only on economy, have the armed forces had penetrated deep into Pakistan’s civil service. The military was granted a quota of 10 per cent of civil service positions at grade BPS-17 and above. During Zia ul Haq's regime the government agreed to reserve 10 per cent of all public-sector vacancies for former members of the armed forces.

In 2003, as many as 104 serving and retired Lieutenant Generals, Major Generals or equivalent ranks from other services were among the 1,027 military officers inducted on civilian posts in different ministries, divisions and Pakistani missions abroad after Oct 12, 1999 military takeover. The number of army Brigadiers or their equivalent ranks from the Navy and Air Force is even higher at 160, according to an annexure placed before the Senate. There have been 14 ambassadors and a high commissioner from the military ranks during this period. In the Foreign Affairs 13 Lieutenants and Major Generals were appointed as ambassadors in different countries, while one Brigadier and a Major also got ambassadorial positions. [10]

While the role of Pakistan army is to be solely the defenders of our Currently, Pakistan Army is currently involved in almost every sector of Pakistan. With political unrest in Pakistan, we see the army threatening the democratic governments to take things into their own hands. Therefore, their over involvement in every sector of Pakistan needs to be reduced. Here are some of the recommendations that can be implemented to disengage the army from internal affairs of Pakistan:

1. Doctrine of necessity should be removed: The term Doctrine of Necessity is used to describe the legal basis for a controversial 1954 judgment in which Pakistani Chief Justice Muhammad Munir validated the extra-constitutional use of emergency powers by Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad[11]. It is through the doctrine of necessity that all the martial laws imposed on this country have been validated by the Supreme Court. Recently, efforts have been seen by Chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhary bury the doctrine of necessity and not to follow it at any cost. However, it is important that the successive Chief Justices follow this as well as other political parties to maintain a stance of not involving or asking help from the army
2. Army budget should be presented in the parliament & gradually decreased: The general practice has been to dismiss the defence budget in a cursory manner, without providing any details. The excuse given, year after year, is that it is not in the national interest to publicly discuss the defence budget[12]. Hence a breakdown of where the money is spent should be presented in the parliament so that there is transparency in what is being spent where. The Asghar khan case is the prime example of the lack of transparency in our system where the army had distributed Rupees 140 million to anti-PPP political candidates before the 1990 general elections[13]. Thus, when the army budget will be presented in the parliament in detail, it will be easier to reduce the expenditures of the army. However, the budget should be decreased gradually in order to avoid any repercussions that may come from this step.
3. Trichotomy of powers: With 3 military coups in our 65 year history and army officials penetrated in every sector of Pakistan; the sole power lies in the hands of the army. Thus, the powers of the country should be divided amongst the army, government and the judiciary. This is important so that no one institution in the country can derail the entire country’s process. It is also important to divide the powers so that there is a system of accountability amongst these institutions and no one power can do whatever they want in the country.
4. Independent judiciary: The Provisional constitutional order is used by the army to legitimize their military coups[14]. General Zia-ul-Haq and Parvez Musharraf took oath of office under the PCO which made them president of Pakistan in their respective time periods. Thus, the judiciary should be independent so that Army chiefs cannot extend their tenures of leading the country.
5. Legal tenures should be followed: Army officials on high posts are offered extensions in their tenures to strengthen their grip of the positions they hold and the powers they have on those posts. Recent examples include DG ISI Ahmed Shuja Pasha given an extension for the second time in his tenure[15] as well as Chief of Army Staff kayani being given a three-year extension in 2010. These extensions lead to penetrations of these high rank officials in the government leading to their over involvement in our system.
6. Merit promotions: officers that have been promoted out of turn have subsequently intervened in political affairs of the country. Zia-Ul-Haq was promoted out of turn by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as well as Musharraf was promoted out of turn by Nawaz Sharif. This act of promoting officers on the basis of personal ties subsequently leads to army leaders doing more than their duty allows them to, which in turn leads to their involvement in internal affairs.

REFERENCES

http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-defence-industry/122186-pakistan-s-defence-budget-cloaked-secrecy.html

http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2010/07/22/pakistans-general-kayani-given-three-year-extension/

http://www.paperpk.com/news/index.php/gillani-offering-extension-in-services-of-dg-lt-isi-ahmed-shuja-pasha/

http://expertscolumn.com/content/role-pak-army-nation-building

http://pkpolitics.com/discuss/topic/pakistan-the-asghar-khan-case

Doctrine of Necessity-Application in Pakistan by Muhammad Nasrullah Virk

http://absarahmed.wordpress.com/2009/04/30/doctrine-of-necessity/

Military INC. – Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy by Dr. Aysha Sidiqa

http://www.journalofamerica.net/html/pak_army.html

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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_coups_in_Pakistan

[2]Naveed Butt. “Pakistan: A dream gone sour by the Fascist Army” < http://www.fascistarmy.org/>

[3] Military Inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy by “Ayesha Siddiqa”-Agha - Pluto Press – 2007

[4] Zeeshan Mansoor. "GlobalResearch.ca - Centre for Research on Globalization”. 2007. Web. 14 May 2012. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va>.

[5] http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/TextContent.aspx?pId=365

[6] Saloni Salil. “Role of Pakistan Armed Forces in 2010 floods”< http://idsa.in/system/files/jds_6_1_SaloniSalil.pdf>

[7] Noorillahi. "ROLE OF PAK ARMY IN NATION BUILDING." ROLE OF PAK ARMY IN NATION BUILDING. June-July 2010. Web. 14 May 2012. <http://expertscolumn.com/content/role-pak-army-nation-building%20>.

[8] http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/awpreview/TextContent.aspx?pId=365

[9] Abdus Sattar Ghazali. "Pak Army." Pak Army. 15 June 2011. Web. 14 May 2012. <http://www.journalofamerica.net/html/pak_army.html>.

[10] Military Inc.: inside Pakistan's military economy by “Ayesha Siddiqa”-Agha - Pluto Press - 2007

[11] Absar Ahmed. "Doctrine of Necessity - a Portal to Martial Law?" My Distinguished Sense, 30 Apr. 2009. Web. 14 May 2012. <http://absarahmed.wordpress.com/2009/04/30/doctrine-of-necessity/>.

[12] http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-defence-industry/122186-pakistan-s-defence-budget-cloaked-secrecy.html

[13] Sultan M Hali. "The Asghar Khan Case." Daily Pakistan Observer. Web. 14 May 2012. <http://pakobserver.net/201202/24/detailnews.asp?id=141736>.

[14] Khalil Afridi. "New Emergency or Provisional Constitution Order(pco)." New Emergency or Provisional Constitution Order(pco). Web. 14 May 2012. <http://www.forumpakistan.com/new-emergency-or-provisional-constitution-orderpco-t2904.html>.

[15] http://www.paperpk.com/news/index.php/gillani-offering-extension-in-services-of-dg-lt-isi-ahmed-shuja-pasha/

Goodbyes

I’ve had to say goodbye more times than I would have liked but everyone can say that, and no matter how many times we do it even when it’s for the greater good, it still stinks and though we will never forget what we have given up, We owe it to ourselves to keep moving forward. What we can’t do is live our lives always afraid of the next goodbye because chances are they are not going to stop. The trick is to recognize when a goodbye can be a good thing, when it’s a chance to start again. 

Convocation: a tribute to my friends

There is a universal truth we all have to face

Whether we want to or not

Everything eventually ends

As much as I looked forward to this day, I dislike endings                       

Last days of summer, the final chapter of a great book

Endings are inevitable

Leaves fall, we close the book and say goodbye

Today is one of those days for us

Today we say goodbye to everything that was familiar

Everything that was comfortable

We’re moving on

But just because vr leaving and it hurts

There are some people who are so much a part of us

Theyl be with us, no matter what

Pakistan Police

INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is currently in the worst possible era since its creation in 1947. In addition to rising tolls on poverty, illiteracy, inflation etc; Pakistan faces its worst threats internally and externally in the form of terrorism, religious extremism, corruption and political instability. It is in these turbulent times that the major institutions of the country should provide the stability and security in the country. It is a known fact that the police in any society play a major role in devising and implementing a proper law enforcement policy. It is the job of the police to stand against any internal act of terrorism or insurgency in the country. Pakistan police, however, has been an exception. The police of our country are more of a liability for this country instead of providing safety and security, maintaining law and order and preventing acts of crime. Since 2002, transparency international has ranked Pakistan police as the most corrupt organization in the country[1]. The table below shows transparency international’s ranking since 2002 till 2009:

[2]

The research study “How Terrorist Groups End: Implications for Countering al Qa’ida” conducted by RAND provides evidence that effective police and intelligence, rather than the use of military force, deliver better counterterrorism results[3]. The case for Pakistan, however, has been completely opposite. The ineffectiveness of the police force has to be compensated by the army. It is not the army’s job to defend the borders as well as deal with internal situations. Their ineffectiveness can also be judged by the low conviction rate, poor quality of criminal investigations, brutal tortures, extralegal killings etc. [4] The problems that this institution creates, in the society, due to its ineffectiveness and the problems within the institution will be discussed in detail later. However, it is important to reform this institution so that law enforcement can function properly in this country. However, in analyzing a problem it is essential to trace the problem back to its root cause. Hence, when analyzing the problems or institutional failure of Pakistan police, it is important to trace back to its’ history to look into where the problem actually started.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It was nearly an 87 year old British system of policing that Pakistan received in 1947. The basic aim of the colonial system of policing was keeping “the natives on a tight leash, not a politically neutral outfit for fair and just enforcement of law. Police was designed to be a public-frightening organization, not a public-friendly agency”[5]. It was noted that the colonial police was kept ‘semi-militarized, semi-literate, underpaid, bodies of men for maintaining order by overawing an often turbulent and hostile – native – population’[6]. The basic premise behind this type of police was to rule the masses and not serve the masses. It was basically the police Act of 1861 that established the above mentioned style of policing in pre-partitioned India. However, even after partition the basic organization of police remained almost the same.

The first attempt at improving the policing style, post partition, came in the February 1948 in the form of XXV Bill of 1948[7]  passed by the Sindh Assembly in order to establish a modern police in Karachi where a commissioner of police was appointed to cope with the law and order situations of a growing population in Karachi. After this, numerous attempts were made in order to reform the Pakistan police. Below, describes the list of attempts made by governments over the years to improve the colonial style of policing still continued in Pakistan.

Passage of Bill to introduce a Metropolitan System of Policing in Karachi	1948
Recommendations of Sir Oliver Gilbert Grace, IG Police, NWFP	1951
Police Commission headed by Mr Justice J.B. Constantine	1961
Pay & Services Reorganisation Committee (Justice Cornelius)	1962
Police Commission headed by Major General A.O. Mitha	1970
Police Station Enquiry Committee headed by M.A.K. Chaudhry, IG Police	1976
Law and Order Sub-Committee headed by Ch. Fazal Haque	1976
Police Reforms Committee headed by Rafi Raza	1976
Orakzai Committee on Police Welfare, Promotion and Seniority Rules	1981
Cabinet Committee on the Emoluments of SHOs	1982
Cabinet Committee on Determining the Status of SHOs	1983
Sahibzada Rauf Ali Committee	1983
The Police Committee headed by Mr Aslam Hayat	1985
Report of the two-member delegation’s visit to Bangladesh and India	1987
Report of the seven-member delegation’s visit to Bangladesh and India	1989
Police Reforms Implementation Committee – M.A.K. Chaudhary	1990
Report of the UN Mission on Organised Crime in Pakistan	1995
Report of the Japanese Police Delegation on the Police System in Pakistan	1996
Committee on Police Reforms under the Chairmanship of Interior Minister	1997
Report of the Good Governance Group on Police Reforms: Committee Vision	1998
Report of the Focal Group on Police Reforms: NRB Draft 2000	2000[8]

Despite all these reports being presented, none of the recommendations were implemented upon and the system of Police created by the British is fundamentally the same. To this date, Pakistan is struggling with the colonial style of coercive policing.

POLICE & MILITARY COUPS

Pakistan and military coups have been almost synonymous with each other. The history of Pakistan and its’ institutions cannot be discussed without mentioning the impact of the military coups on these institutions. Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has been under the military dictatorship 53% of the time in its 65 year history.[9] As mentioned before, Pakistan police had been struggling with its role in the country since the creation of Pakistan and with the imposition of first martial law in 1958, Ayub Khan used the police to “suppress political dissent and  to marginalize opposition politicians”[10]. The oppressive role that the police had been playing in the society and had been trying to get rid off was revived again under Ayub khan.

The second military coup under Army chief Zia-Ul-Haq proved even more disastrous for this institution. Again, Zia-Ul-Haq used the police to suppress politicians and appointed military officials on high ranks of the police[11]. With the army taking control of everything in their own hands, Zia-ul-haq even deprived the Pakistan police of its’ resources.

The third military coup under Musharraf proved to be rather helpful for the Pakistan police. It was under the military dictatorship of Musharraf that the police order of 2002 was introduced. The key features of the police order of 2002 included:

1.    Additional checks on police through an independent prosecution service.

2.    Citizen Police Liaison commissions for police accountability in independent citizen commissions

3.    Establishment of Criminal Justice Coordination Committees

4.    Separating operational duties from investigation

5.    Effective internal accountability by police command

6.    Operational and administrative autonomy

7.    Organize police on functional basis[12]

STRUCTURE & EXISTING FUNCTIONS

The Pakistan police is divided into 2 major subdivisions, the first being the Federal police and then the provincial police organizations. Under the constitution of 1973, criminal law and procedure are jointly the centre and provinces’ responsibility[13]. The following describes the two major subdivisions of the police, the regulatory organizations under these subdivisions along with their existing functions:

FEDERAL POLICE

The list below describes the organizations under the federal police:

• Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
• Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF)
• Frontier Constabulary
• Frontier Corps
• Pakistan Coast Guards
• Pakistan Rangers
• National Highways and Motorways Police (NHMP)
• Pakistan Railways Police
• Islamabad Police, Islamabad Capital Territory [14]

Broadly describing it, the federal police is entitled to cross-provincial control of any offences against the federal government. Organizations such as ANF, as the name suggests, controls narcotics trafficking and NHMP controls the traffic systems on highway and motorway. The general responsibilities under organizations like Frontier constabulary, frontier corps, Pakistan coast guards and Pakistan rangers are: “a) securing and checking illegal border crossings; b) preventing smuggling; c) enforcing drug control; and d) assisting provincial governments in maintaining law and order when requested.”[15] While the above mentioned organizations deal with specialized issues, the FIA deals with serious offences against the federation like high treason.

PROVINCIAL POLICE

Maintaining law and order in the provinces is the main responsibility of the provincial police (i.e. Punjab police, Sindh police, Khyberpakhtunkhwa police and Baluchistan police). The provincial police organizations are completely decentralized and are not integrated on a national level.

PROBLEMS

As of today, Pakistan is in its’ most troubled times since its inception. Faced with an internal and external crisis, Pakistan seems to be stuck in the middle. With a multitude of external and internal problems that it faces today, the country has to also deal with an ineffective criminal justice institution like the police. Below, describes the list of problems that hinders this institution from functioning properly:

1. Lack of coordination between different criminal justice institutions and intelligence agencies: Pakistan’s biggest threat comes from its own produce of extremist groups. Since 2000, there have been 353 suicide attacks which have taken approximately 5000 precious lives[16]. A severe lack of coordination amongst police and institutions like FIA and ISI weakens the police’s strength to combat and strategize for counterterrorism. The prime example of lack of coordination is the Benazir Bhutto assassination where the ISI “was conducting its own investigation but only selectively shared the evidence it collected with the police[17]”.

Moreover, there is no coordination in the institution itself. Since, constitutionally policing is a provincial matter, the police of different provinces is not coordinated as well.

2. The Police Act of 1861 and the Police Order of 2002: The criminal justice institution of a democratic country should be ideally serving the masses in providing safety, security and justice to the citizens. However, our police operate on a system that was designed to rule the masses rather than serve them. This, in turn, creates confusion for the police on which role they should play.

The Police Order of 2002 was a valid attempt at revolutionizing the policing system in this country; however the halfhearted implementation of the Police Order has left the police standing to where it was before.

3. Political interference: As mentioned earlier as well, Pakistan police has always been the puppet of the political parties. The police have been fighting the masses for the governments. All military leaders that have ruled the country have used the police to suppress political parties from protesting. The police should be for protecting the interests of the people is used to sustain powers by different political parties.
4. Thana culture: The Thana culture represents the status of the Police in the society where they are unaccountable for any wrongdoing or disregard of human rights. The table below shows the complaints against the police in session courts:

[18]

5. Corruption: Over the years, Pakistan has seen a sharp increase in crime rates in addition to terrorism activities. Subsequently, there has also been a rising trend in the budget allocations as well. While budgets are allocated for the functioning of the organization, the budgets of the police seem to be used only for filling pockets. With over a population of 170 million, the Pakistan Police is highly understaffed with only 350,000 men who make a ratio of 485 civilians to 1 policeman[19]. Even with such low numbers of policemen, most of the time the policemen are being used for providing protocol to politicians, foreign dignitaries etc.

IMPACT ANALYSIS

Pakistan police is an institution that is surrounded by trouble both internally and externally. The main problems, outlined above, in the institution create an impact on the whole society. Since Police is considered as the prime law enforcement institution in the country, a failure on the Police’s part increases the crime and uncertainty in the country. As seen in Pakistan’s case, the increase in terrorism activities impacted Pakistan both financially and socially.

The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of this institution also gives a chance for the army to indulge in every internal affair in the country. With the police failing to perform their duties efficiently, the army has to be called to take control of situations. The most recent case of police’s inefficiency can be seen in the lyari incident where the situation was getting out of the hands of the police and hence the army was called to take control of the situation.

REFORMS & IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

The above mentioned problems create the need for the government to reform the organization. In the past few years, we have seen the complete breakdown of our criminal justice system. From the police abusing their rights and disregarding human rights to merely being the puppets of the politicians, the Pakistan police needs to be reformed so that our justice system can move in a positive direction.

1.    From a constitutional standpoint, the Pakistan police have a different role as compared to what it should be playing in a democratic society. This case is especially valid in Pakistan where extremist groups and terrorism is so entrenched in the society that an effective police system is mandatory. Thus, the Police Act of 1861 should be replaced with the Police Order of 2002 with its additional amendments so that a new policing system could be implemented. As for the implementation, the Police Order of 2002 should be implemented gradually in provinces so that there is no resistance towards the new system. Also, the system should be implemented in police training academies so that officers can be trained in the same manner.

In order to practically implement the Police order nationwide, the Police Order needs to be presented in the parliament and if the police order attains 2/3^rd majority, it can be easily implemented throughout the country.

2.    In order to cope with insurgency situations and extremist activities in the country, Pakistan Police is extremely understaffed as well as untrained to combat such situations. Hence, the strength of the police should be increased as well as specializations like terrorist activities and forensics should be promoted.[20] In order to employ more people in the police, we will require more financial resources. However, the budgets for the police are good enough if corruption is eradicated from the country. The table below shows the Punjab police Budgets from 2000-2008:

[21]

This table gives a rough estimate as to the amount of financial resources allocated to the Police with a 248% increase in budgets in 8 years. Hence, there is no lack of financial resources; if the corruption is eradicated, the amount of officers can be increased easily.

3.    Another problem that is interlinked to this situation is the problem of police being consigned to VIP protocols and politicians’ securities. Thus, a special unit should be designed amongst the police who are only responsible for the security of officials. Also, the security with retired officers and post holders should be reduced.

4.    In order to combat corruption within the organization, the salaries and incentives of the police should be increased. As seen in the case of National Highway & Motorway Police, incentives can lead to better performance.

5.    In order to increase the accountability of the police, accountability mechanisms should be devised both internally and externally in the police so that the police cannot abuse the powers in their hands. In order to do that, firstly, the anti corruption laws should be strengthened to combat corruption within the organization and public safety commissions should be setup under the police order of 2002 where the police can  be held accountable.

6.    Leadership plays an important role in the governance of an organization. Hence, honest and experienced officers should be assigned on high posts in the police. Also, the army officers’ 10% quota of police positions should also be abolished so that army’s involvement in the police affairs can be reduced.

CONCLUSION

It is a known fact that the police is an ineffective institution and reforming this organization can be a huge task but in order to make Pakistan a democratic and free society, the law enforcement should be strict so that the citizens of this country can feel at safe in their own country. 

[1] http://www.transparency.org.pk/pr/press%20release%20embargo.pdf

[2] http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pesr/PDF-FILES/7%20JAVAID%20Corruption%20and%20its%20Deep%20Impact%20on%20Good%20Governance%2085.pdf

[3] Hassan Abbas. "Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counter insurgency and Counterterrorism Success." - Harvard. Http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu, 2009. Web. 06 June 2012. <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/18976/police_law_enforcement_reform_in_pakistan.html>.

[4] Asad Jamal. “Revisiting Police Laws.” Web. 02 June 2012. http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Revisiting%20Police%20Laws%20-%20Asad%20Jamal.pdf.

[5] Muhammad Shoaib Suddle. "REFORMING PAKISTAN POLICE: AN OVERVIEW.” Http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf. Www.unafei.or.jp. Web. <www.unafei.or.jp>.

[6] Muhammad Shoaib Suddle. "REFORMING PAKISTAN POLICE: AN OVERVIEW." Http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf. Www.unafei.or.jp. Web. <www.unafei.or.jp>.

[7] Muhammad Shoaib Suddle. "REFORMING PAKISTAN POLICE: AN OVERVIEW." Http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no60/ch05.pdf. Www.unafei.or.jp. Web. <www.unafei.or.jp>.

[8] "Balochistan Police Official Site." Balochistan Police Official Site. Http://www.balochistanpolice.gov.pk, 2007. Web. 04 June 2012. <http://www.balochistanpolice.gov.pk/thesis/ComReports.php>.

[9] Muhammad Iqbal Malik. "Political Transitions and Instability in Pakistan." Lets Start Thinking -. Web. 05 June 2012. <http://www.letsstartthinking.org/history/political-transitions-and-instability.asp>.

[10] "REFORMING PAKISTAN’S POLICE." Http://www.crisisgroup.org, 14 July 2008. Web. 04 June 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/157_reforming_pakistan_s_police.ashx>.

[11] "REFORMING PAKISTAN’S POLICE." Http://www.crisisgroup.org, 14 July 2008. Web. 04 June 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/157_reforming_pakistan_s_police.ashx>.

[12] Dr. M. Shoaib Suddle,  Asad Jahangir Khan, Dr. Shafqat Ali Shah Jamote, and Mr. Kamran Rasool. "REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON POLICE REFORM.". Web. 9 June 2012. <www.ncgr.gov.pk/Forms/16.../police_reform7-9.doc>.

[13] "REFORMING PAKISTAN’S POLICE." . Http://www.crisisgroup.org, 14 July 2008. Web. 04 June 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/157_reforming_pakistan_s_police.ashx>.

[14] Asad Jamal. "POLICE ORGANISATIONS IN PAKISTAN." . May 2010. Web. 04 June 2012. <http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan[1].pdf>.

[15] Asad Jamal. "POLICE ORGANISATIONS IN PAKISTAN." Http://www.hrcp-web.org. May 2010. Web. 04 June 2012. <http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Police_Organisations_in_Pakistan[1].pdf>.

[16] "Suicide Bombing in Pakistan | PakistanBodyCount.org." Suicide Bombing in Pakistan | PakistanBodyCount.org. Http://pakistanbodycount.org/suicide_bombing, n.d. Web. 11 June 2012.

[17] Frédéric Grare. "Political Dimensions of Police Reform in Pakistan."Carnegieendowment.org. N.p., 14 July 2010. Web. 12 June 2012. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_police.pdf>.

[18] Asad Jamal. “Revisiting Police Laws.” Web. 02 June 2012. http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Revisiting%20Police%20Laws%20-%20Asad%20Jamal.pdf.          

[19] Hassan Abbas. "Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counter insurgency and Counterterrorism Success." - Harvard. Http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu, 2009. Web. 06 June 2012. <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/18976/police_law_enforcement_reform_in_pakistan.html>.

[20] http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/157_reforming_pakistan_s_police.ashx

[21] Asad Jamal. “Revisiting Police Laws.” Web. 02 June 2012. http://www.hrcp-web.org/pdf/Revisiting%20Police%20Laws%20-%20Asad%20Jamal.pdf.